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Articles
Painting Over Long-Standing
Precedent: How the Rhode Island
Supreme Court Misapplied Public
Nuisance Law in State v. Lead
Industries Association
Fidelma Fitzpatrick*
INTRODUCTION
In February 2006, the State of Rhode Island scored a decisive
trial victory for all children who have, or will be, plagued by the
scourge of lead poisoning in the State. A unanimous jury declared
the presence of lead pigment in homes and buildings throughout
the State of Rhode Island to be a public nuisance and further
ordered that three former manufacturers of lead pigments abate
* Partner, Motley Rice, LLP, Providence, Rhode Island. J.D., American
University Law School (1994). Ms. Fitzpatrick represented the State of
Rhode Island in its historic case against the lead pigment industry, serving
as trial counsel and appellate counsel. In addition to her work on behalf of
the State of Rhode Island, she also represents the City and County of San
Francisco in their public nuisance suit against the lead pigment
manufacturers. The author wishes to thank Senator Sheldon Whitehouse for
his courage in bringing the suit, Rhode Island Attorney General Patrick
Lynch for continuing to fight for the children of Rhode Island, and the
Honorable Michael Silverstein for guiding this often contentious litigation
with unfailing patience and untiring attention. It was truly an honor to work
with each of them.
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the nuisance that they created. 1 The trial verdict was heralded as
one of the most important public health victories for children in
the last decade and signaled the beginning of the end of childhood
lead poisoning in Rhode Island. 2
The import of eradicating lead poisoning of children cannot be
denied. There is virtual unanimity in the medical community
about the adverse effects of lead paint on the cognitive
development of children. Indeed, the Centers for Disease
Control3 , the American Academy of PediatricS4, the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development5 , the United
1. See Peter B. Lord, 3 Companies Found Liable in Lead-Paint Public
Nuisance Suit, PROVIDENCE J., Feb 23, 2006, at Al [hereinafter "3
Companies"]; Raja Mishra, Rhode Island Wins Lead Paint Suit, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb 23, 2006, at B2; Peter Krouse, Sherwin Williams Loses Lead
Lawsuit; Stock Falls 18 Percent After Rhode Island Verdict, CLEV. PLAIN-
DEALER, Feb, 23, 2006, at C1.
2. See Lord, 3 Companies, supra note 1 ('This is a very important,
milestone victory for those across the nation who work on childhood lead-
poisoning prevention because it sets a historical precedent as the first time a
state or local government has been able to hold lead-pigment manufacturers
accountable for their actions in a judicial setting,' said the Alliance's Brian
Gumm . . . 'We are absolutely thrilled,' said Roberta Hazen Aaronson,
executive director of the Childhood Lead Action Project, an advocacy group
for lead-poisoned children. 'Sometimes in this not so friendly world, the
Goliaths are defeated and justice triumphs. This precedent-setting decision
feels like a home run for the families devastated by lead poisoning and for a
community that has borne the cost of this industry-made public health
disaster."').
3. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD
POISONING IN YOUNG CHILDREN, 7 (1991), http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/
publications/books/plpyc/chapter2.htm ("Lead is a poison that affects
virtually every system in the body. It is particularly harmful to the
developing brain and nervous system of fetuses and young children . . .. The
risks of lead exposure are not based on theoretical calculations. They are
well known from studies of children themselves and are not extrapolated
from data on laboratory animals or high-dose occupational exposures.").
4. American Academy of Pediatrics, Lead Exposure in Children:
Prevention, Detection and Management, 116 PEDIATRICS 1036, 1037 (Oct.
2005) ("At the levels of lead exposure now seen in the United States,
subclinical effects on the central nervous system (CNS) are the most common
effects. The best-studied effect is cognitive impairment, measured by IQ tests.
The strength of this association and its time course have been observed to be
similar in multiple studies in several countries.").
5. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISKS AND
SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN, ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A
FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT HAZARDS (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/leadlabout/fedstrategy2000.pdf ("Levels as low as 10
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
States Environmental Protection Agency 6 and the United States
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry7 all concur that
lead poisoning of children under the age of six can cause learning
disabilities, behavioral issues, and decreased IQ. Furthermore,
although there has been widespread attention given to the use of
lead paint on children's toys in recent years8, the primary source
of childhood lead poisoning in the United States today is lead
paint on the walls and woodwork of a child's own home. 9
micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood (pg/dL) in infants, children, and
pregnant women are associated with impaired cognitive function, behavior
difficulties, fetal organ development, and other problems. In addition, low
levels of lead in children's blood can cause reduced intelligence, impaired
hearing and reduced stature. Lead toxicity has been well-established, with
evidence of harmful effects found in children whose blood lead levels exceed
10 pig/dL.").
6. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BASIC
INFORMATION: LEAD IN PAINT, DUST, AND SOIL, http://www.epa.gov/lead/pubs/
leadinfo.htm (click on "Health Effects of Lead" hyperlink) ("[C]hildren with
high levels of lead in their bodies can suffer from: [d]amage to the brain and
nervous system; [b]ehavior and learning problems, such as hyperactivity;
[s]lowed growth; [h]earing problems; [and] [h]eadaches."
7. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
AGENCY FOR TOXIc SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH
STATEMENT FOR LEAD (Aug. 2007), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tpl3-
cl-b.pdf ("[C]hild who swallows large amounts of lead may develop anemia,
kidney damage, colic (severe 'stomach ache'), muscle weakness, and brain
damage, which ultimately can kill the child. In some cases, the amount of
lead in the child's body can be lowered by giving the child certain drugs that
help eliminate lead from the body. If a child swallows smaller amounts of
lead, such as dust containing lead from paint, much less severe but still
important effects on blood, development, and behavior may occur. In this
case, recovery is likely once the child is removed from the source of lead
exposure, but there is no guarantee that the child will completely avoid all
long-term consequences of lead exposure. At still lower levels of exposure,
lead can affect a child's mental and physical growth. Fetuses exposed to lead
in the womb, because their mothers had a lot of lead in their bodies, may be
born prematurely and have lower weights at birth. Exposure in the womb, in
infancy, or in early childhood also may slow mental development and cause
lower intelligence later in childhood. There is evidence that these effects may
persist beyond childhood.").
8. Katie Charles, Nothing to Toy With! Playthings Can Expose Kids to
Lead and Other Harmful Substances; The Best Remedy is Parental Caution,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 17, 2008, at 34; Rummana Hussain, Lead Fears
Force Recall of American Girl Jewelry: Pieces Have Been Sold in Chicago for
Past 7 Years, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at 20.
9. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH
STATEMENT FOR LEAD (Aug. 2007) ("People living in areas where there are old
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The problem of lead poisoning is particularly acute in Rhode
Island. The state has been dubbed the lead poisoning capitol of
the United States.10 According to reports, Providence children
entering kindergarten in recent years with even relatively low
levels of lead in their blood were far less likely to meet national
standards for readiness to read.11 In large part, Rhode Island's
lead poisoning problem is caused by a perfect storm of factors: (1)
the large percentage of the housing stock constructed prior to
1950; (2) the ubiquity of lead paint on these old homes; and (3) the
socio-economic realities of certain older neighborhoods,
particularly those with multi-family housing units.
The jury verdict was seen as a necessary step in eradicating
lead poisoning by attacking it at the source. The remedy sought -
primary prevention of lead poisoning by abatement of the lead
paint - was intended to ensure that future generations of children
are protected from a known health hazard. Work had begun on
the plan for abatement in conformity with the jury's directive.
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the jury
verdict in 2008, thus substituting its judgment for that of the six-
member jury who had sacrificed almost four months of their life to
exercise their civic duty.12 The 2008 decision essentially
overruled the trial court's decision on the motion to dismiss. That
motion, filed in 2000 and decided on April 2, 2001, found that the
State could adequately state a claim in public nuisance against
the former manufacturers of lead pigment. 13 There, the court
houses that have been painted with lead paint may be exposed to higher
levels of lead in dust and soil."); American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note
4, at 1037 ("The source of most lead poisoning in children now is dust and
chips from deteriorating lead paint on interior surfaces."); UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, PROTECTING YOUR CHILD FROM
LEAD POIsONING, "WHERE LEAD Is LIKELY To BE A PROBLEM",
http://www.epa.gov/lead/pubs/leadinfo.htm#hazard.
10. Peter B. Lord, Are Lead-paint Firms Liable for Damages?,
PROVIDENCE J., June 18, 1999, at 1A.
11. Peter B. Lord, Study of Providence Children: Even Slightly High Lead
Levels Hurt Abilities, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 30, 2009, at 6. This conclusion is
consistent with the newest published studies on the effects of lead poisoning.
See Chandramouli K. et al., Effects of Early Childhood Lead Exposure on
Academic Performance and Behavior of School Age Children, 94 ARCHIVES OF
DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 844-48 (2009).
12. Lord, 3 Companies, supra note 1.
13. State of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, et al., No. 99-5226, 2001
R.I. Super. LEXIS 37, at *19-28 (R.I. Super. Apr. 2, 2001).
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
summarized the State's public nuisance claim as follows:
Here, the Attorney General, as guardian of the public,
asserts that the defendants, as manufacturers, promoters
and suppliers, are responsible for the presence of lead, a
substance alleged to be a health hazard to members of the
public, in public and private buildings throughout the
State. Further, the State also contends that the
defendants' misconduct, by causing a public health crisis,
has caused the State to incur substantial damages. In its
expansive request for relief, the State, in part, seeks an
order for the abatement of lead.14
Significantly, the trial court also stated that: "[a]ccording to
the defendants herein, the State has not asserted a public
nuisance claim because a public right has not been infringed and
because the defendants' lead did not cause the alleged harm while
within their control as product manufacturers or promoters." 15
These two issues - whether a public right was infringed and
whether the defendants had adequate control over the nuisance -
were at the heart of the Supreme Court decision over seven years
later. 16
This Article examines the Supreme Court's decision on each of
these issues, ultimately concluding that the decision is at odds
with decades-long, if not centuries-long, precedent in Rhode Island
and across the country. Not only is the decision contrary to the
14. Id. at *20.
15. Id. at *26.
16. The timing of the Supreme Court decision certainly raises questions
concerning judicial economy. The initial decision on the motion to dismiss
was April 2, 2001. Between April 2001 and the beginning of the trial in
October 2005, the lead paint defendants filed four petitions for writ of
certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court that were denied. See, e.g.,
State of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 2004-63-M.P., 2006 WL
1506312 (R.I. June 2, 2006) (writ of certiorari quashed regarding fee
agreement). One petition was granted concerning the State's contingency fee
agreement, although that issue was consolidated with the final post-trial
appeal. See Notice, dated April 14, 2004; Order, dated May 21, 2007 (on file
with author). Furthermore, on the eve of the first trial, the Defendants even
requested an emergency stay of the trial from the United States Supreme
Court that was summarily denied by Justice David Souter. If the Rhode
Island Supreme Court had serious concerns about the trial court's decision on
the motion to dismiss, judicial economy would have been served by reviewing
the decision at the earliest stages.
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basic foundations of public nuisance law and well-established
precedent, it has dangerous implications in Rhode Island and
elsewhere. The first section summarizes the law of public
nuisance as it existed prior to the 2008 decision. The second
section explores the Supreme Court's role in redefining the scope
of public nuisance law in Rhode Island, examining the manner in
which it defined public rights. The third section explores the new
rules of liability for public nuisance in Rhode Island, contrasting
that rule against the prevailing rule of law in Rhode Island prior
to the decision. The final section discusses the implications of the
decision for future public nuisance cases.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ANCIENT LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
Public nuisance is an ancient legal doctrine dating back to the
founding of this country. The United States Supreme Court
summarized this history over a century ago in Mugler v. Kansas:
[T]he jurisdiction of courts of equity seems to be of a very
ancient date, and has been distinctly traced back to the
reign of Queen Elizabeth. * * * In case of public
nuisances, properly so called, an indictment lies to abate
them, and to punish the offenders. But an information
also lies in equity to redress the grievance by way of
injunction. 17
In Thornton v. Grant, the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized
that the law of public nuisance "as declared in the English cases
has been recognized by the courts of this country, and has been
applied in some cases with liberality towards the riparian
proprietor." 18
Rhode Island is not unique in its long and rich legal history
17. 123 U.S. 623, 672-73 (1887) (citing 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 921, 922). See
also Respublica v. Caldwell, 1 U.S. 150 (1785) (recognizing a public nuisance);
Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 289 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The nuisance action
originated in the twelfth century. Courts first recognized 'private' nuisances,
and by the sixteenth century, began to recognize 'public' nuisances."); Ellwest
Stereo Theaters Inc. of Texas v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702, 706 (D.C. Tex. 1979)
("It is ancient law that public nuisances may be enjoined."); People ex rel.
Lemon v. Caparbo, 238 N.Y.S. 197, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929) ('That equity has
jurisdiction in regard to public nuisances is not at all doubtful; in fact, it is an
ancient legal truism.").
18. 10 R.I. 477, 1873 WL 3550, at *5 (R.I. 1873).
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
that recognizes both the existence of the common law public
nuisance cause of action, as well as the power of the Attorney
General to bring such an action. When former Attorney General
Sheldon Whitehouse commenced the State's public nuisance suit
against the lead pigment manufacturers in 1999 to protect the
public from the health hazards associated with lead in the State,
he did so in accord with his powers and duties as set forth in R.I.
Gen. Laws § 42-9-2 and Rhode Island common law. Well-
established precedent in Rhode Island recognizes that the
Attorney General has the responsibility for prosecuting civil
actions to protect the public health, safety and welfare. In the
words of the Rhode Island Supreme Court:
In this state it was long ago settled that 'Suits for the
public should be placed in public and responsible hands.'.
. . The public officer vested with that authority is the
attorney general of the state. Only he may sue to redress
a purely public wrong except in those instances where one
of the public who is injured has a distinct personal legal
interest different from that of the public at large, as
where a public office is being withheld from the rightful
incumbent thereof. 19
19. McCarthy v. McAloon, 83 A.2d 75, 78 (R.I. 1951) (internal citations
omitted). See also Newport Realty, Inc. v. Lynch, 878 A.2d 1021, 1032 (R.I.
2005) ("This Court has recognized that the Attorney General is vested with
the authority to maintain suits seeking redress of a public wrong . . .").
Requiring a responsible public official to act when the public health and
welfare is involved protects courts from floods of litigation while
simultaneously requiring public officials to exercise their "political
responsibility" for the health and welfare of citizens. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 90, at 646 (5th ed. 1984)
("Redress of the wrong to the community must be left to its appointed
representatives. The best reason that has been given for the rule is that it
relieves the defendant of the multiplicity of actions which might follow if
everyone were free to sue for the common harm."). As the United States
Supreme Court has recognized:
A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the
name of the United States by those who are entrusted with the
constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,'. . . differs in kind from the suit of an individual .... Suits
brought by the United States itself require the exercise of political
responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control
which is absent from a broad delegation to private persons ....
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56 (1999).
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This power includes the unique authority to prosecute public
nuisances and other cases impacting the health and welfare of the
residents of the State. 20
Pursuant to this tradition, Rhode Island courts have long
recognized that interferences with the public health, safety, peace,
comfort and convenience can constitute an actionable public
nuisance. 21 Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in State
of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had routinely and repeatedly defined public nuisance as:
20. See State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. 497 (R.I. 1858) (early case recognizing
public nuisance suit by the State); Pine v. Vinagro, No. PC-95-4928, 1996 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 100, at *53 (R.I. Super. Nov. 4, 1996) ("Among the awesome
responsibilities of the Attorney General [of Rhode Island] is that of
prosecuting a public nuisance at common law .... ); Whitehouse v. New
England Ecological Dev., Inc., No. 98-4525, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 154, at
*18 (R.I. Super. Oct. 28, 1999) ("This Court recognizes that one of the
responsibilities of the Attorney General is prosecuting a public nuisance at
common law . . . ."); Pine v. Shell Oil, No. 92-0346B, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21043, at * 14 (D.R.I. Aug. 23, 1993) (finding that the Attorney General of
Rhode Island has the authority to maintain a public nuisance suit to remedy
harm to the public).
21. See cases discussed in note 19, supra. Many other jurisdictions have
adopted a public nuisance cause of action. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 964 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (defining
public nuisance as "a species of catch-all low-grade criminal offense,
consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large, which
may include anything from the blocking of a highway to a gaming-house or
indecent exposure."); Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. The Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 137,
1882 WL 8213, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1882) ("Public or common
nuisances, as defined by Blackstone, 'are a species of offenses against public
order and economical regimen of the state, being either the doing of a thing to
the annoyance of all the King's subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which
the common good required..."'); Attorney General v. Chicago and NW Ry. Co.,
25 Wis. 425, 1874 WL 3392, at *46 (Wis. 1874) (finding that a public nuisance
is "anything unlawful, which works hurt, inconvenience or damage"); City of
Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *14
(Mass. Super. July, 13 2000) ("A public nuisance differs from a private
nuisance: 'It is a much broader term and encompasses much conduct other
than the type that interferes with the use and enjoyment of private property.'
Thus, in its broadest statement, the concept of public nuisance 'seems
unconnected to place or property."'); JOSEPH H. JOYCE & HOWARD C. JOYCE,
TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING NUISANCES 2 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1906)
("A nuisance may generally be defined as anything that works or causes
injury, damage, hurt, inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort to one in the
enjoyment of legitimate and reasonable rights of person or property."); 2
HOWARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO INJUNCTIONS § 1042
(Matthew Bender & Co. 1909) (liability for public nuisance can arise from an
omission or a positive act).
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
[A]n unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public: it is behavior that unreasonably
interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience of the general community.22
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a condition can be
unreasonable under public nuisance law when it poses either: (1)
"a significant interference with the public health, the public
safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public
convenience;" or (2) if "the conduct is of a continuing nature or has
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the
public right." 23
Thus, Rhode Island courts have long recognized the
applicability of public nuisance claims in environmental
contamination cases. For example, in one of the earliest reported
cases, Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that:
[A]ny manufacturer who allows his deleterious waste
product to contaminate the waters of the State, be they
public or private, is liable to any person who is injured
thereby in his private capacity and apart from being
merely one of the public . . . .24
Since then, the doctrine has been consistently applied in
situations where a company creates an environmental threat to
the health and safety of Rhode Islanders. 25
22. Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59 (R.I.
1980) (quoting Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d
968, 971 (N.Y. 1977)) (emphasis added). See also Arriaga v. New England
Gas Co., 483 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.R.I. 2007) ("A right 'common to the general
public' has been described as a collective right that is shared by everyone in
the community as opposed to a right that is possessed only by certain
members of the public. . . . In general, it refers to the interference with 'the
health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the general community."')
(internal citations omitted); Pine v. Shell Oil, No. 92-0346B, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21043, at *5 (D.R.I. Aug. 23, 1993); Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738
F. Supp. 623, 635 (D.R.I. 1990).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) and (c) (1979)
(emphasis added).
24. 77 A. 145, 151 (1910).
25. See Corvello v. New England Gas Co., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398
(D.R.I. 2008) (wherein "[m]ore than 120 residents of Tiverton, Rhode Island
2010] 445
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This use of public nuisance law to remediate environmental
contamination cases is consistent with precedent from around the
country. As two commentators have noted:
Because of its flexibility, common law nuisance continues
to play a vital role in complementing statutory
environmental enforcement tools . . . [e]nvironmental
harm is the quintessential public nuisance. In fact,
modern environmental and energy statutes are
codifications of the common law of public nuisance.26
brought these actions against New England Gas Company ("NEG") alleg[ed]
that their properties ha[d] been contaminated by hazardous substances
contained in coal gasification wastes buried in the soil on or near their
properties . .. ."); Reitsma v. Recchia, No. 00-4111, 2000 WL 1781960, at *6
(R.I. Super. Nov. 20, 2000) (wherein the State, through the Attorney General,
brought a public nuisance action against the operator of a solid waste
disposal facility; court concluded that "the odors emanating from the Recchia
property constitute a public nuisance, which in the absence of relief, will
continue to unreasonably interfere with neighbors' use and enjoyment of
their premises."); Whitehouse v. New England Ecological Development, Inc.,
No. 98-4525, 1999 WL 1001188, at *6 (R.I. Super. Oct. 28, 1999) (wherein the
State, through the Attorney General, brought suit against companies that
disposed of out-of-state waste in Rhode Island); Pine v. Vinagro, No. PC-95-
4928, 1996 WL 937004, at *21 (R.I. Super. Nov. 4, 1996) (wherein the
Attorney General brought a public nuisance action and court concluded that
"maintaining of open stockpiles of unprocessed construction and demolition
debris, especially if it contains partially decomposed, or rotting, organic
material is a public nuisance because of the plain risk of fire, smoke and
odors."); Pine v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-0346B, 1993 WL 389396 (D.R.I. Aug. 23,
1993) (Attorney General, "as 'parens patriae for Rhode Island's citizens, and
as Rhode Island's environmental advocate"' brought public nuisance claim
against lessee of a gasoline service station alleging that it released a quantity
of hydrocarbon pollution into the ground surrounding the service station,
thus polluting the ground and the water supply); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d
1244 (R.I. 1982) (defendants liable for creating a public nuisance by
maintaining a hazardous waste dump site that polluted the land and water
surrounding the property); Braun v. Iannotti, 189 A. 25 (R.I. 1937) (public
nuisance created by emitting smoke and soot from smokestack). See also
Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous
Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENvTL. L. J. 187, 215 (1996) (recognizing
Rhode Island was one of the first states to uphold a public nuisance claim in
a modern hazardous waste contamination case).
26. Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Behind the Curve: The
National Media's Reporting on Global Warming, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
485, 487-88 (2006). See also Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir.
2001) ("The theory of nuisance lends itself naturally to combating the harms
created by environmental problems."); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 101 F.3d 503, 505 (7th
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
In fact, not only does public nuisance provide for protection of the
public health, it serves as the "backbone" of modern
environmental law statutes, including the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA")27 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA").28
Public nuisance has thus long enjoyed an enviable, albeit
limited, role in our jurisprudence. It has always been a powerful
tool in a limited arsenal of legal theories available to our public
officials that allows them to be proactive in protecting the public
health, safety and welfare of the people.
II. THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT'S DEFINITION OF PUBLIC
RIGHT IS AT ODDS WITH ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT AND SEVERELY
LIMITS THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has reached a deeply
troubling conclusion when it found that "a necessary element of
public nuisance is an interference with a public right - those
indivisible resources shared by the public at large, such as air,
water or public rights of way."29 In so ruling, the Court concluded
that "[tihe term public right is reserved more appropriately for
those indivisible resources shared by the public at large, such as
air, water, or public rights of way." 30 Most surprisingly, the Court
stated that:
Although the state asserts that the public's right to be
free from the hazards of unabated lead had been
Cir. 1996) (The "interests [of environmental statutes] overlap to a great
extent the interests that nuisance law protects."); State v. Schweda, 736
N.W.2d 49, 75 (Wis. 2007) ("Scholarly commentary recognizes the link
between modern statutory environmental law and the common law of
nuisance."); Richard A. Epstein, Regulation-And Contract-In Environmental
Law, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 859, 862 (1990-91) ("When you go back to the early
history of environmental law, the one substantive area that you would want
to turn to more than any other would be the common law of nuisance.");
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 100
(1977) ("The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental law are found
in principles of nuisance.").
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2008).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2008).
29. State of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I.
2008) (emphasis added).
30. . Id.
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infringed, this contention falls far short of alleging an
interference with a public right as that term traditionally
has been understood in the law of public nuisance. The
state's allegation that defendants have interfered with
the 'health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the
residents of the [s]tate' standing alone does not constitute
an allegation of interference with a public right... .31
This conclusion is legally flawed in several respects and has
created contradictory case law in Rhode Island that may lead to a
virtual evisceration of public nuisance law as it has historically
been defined. 32
A. The Legal Definition of Public Nuisance Under Rhode Island
Law
It is axiomatic that a public nuisance claim must involve an
interference with a public right. Indeed, courts have long noted
this critical distinction between public nuisances and private
nuisances:
Historically, claims for private nuisance have been
"narrowly restricted to the invasion of interests in the use
or enjoyment of land" caused by a defendant's use of his
own property. By contrast, claims of public nuisance
"extend[ed] to virtually any form of annoyance or
inconvenience interfering with common public rights." . .
. Under Rhode Island law, "[a] cause of action for private
nuisance 'arises from the unreasonable use of one's
property that materially interferes with a neighbor's
physical comfort or the neighbor's use of his real estate"'
and "a public nuisance is an 'unreasonable interference
31. Id. at 455.
32. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision curiously relied heavily
on a law review article published by the University of Cincinnati Law Review
in 2003 by Donald Gifford, a professor of law at the University of Maryland
School of Law. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products
Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 741 (Spring 2003). Professor Gifford,
however, is a paid consultant to the lead paint companies. See Eric Tucker,
Lead Paint Ruling Could Lead to More Lawsuits, Experts Say, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2006. It is concerning that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
would overlook its own precedent in favor of a position advocated by an
advisor to the lead paint companies.
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with a right common to the general public.' 33
Thus, it is well settled that while private nuisance claims concern
only a plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his or her own property,
public nuisances required something broader and more far
reaching to sustain an appropriate cause of action.34 However,
while courts have been able to articulate an appropriate and
comprehensive legal standard for defining such public rights, the
application of the standard has proved difficult.
There can be no question that the recognition of public rights
in public nuisance law is an art rather than a science. For
example, prior to the 2008 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision,
Rhode Island courts were uniform in their definition of "public
right" under public nuisance law. That definition - "behavior that
unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience of the general community" - was articulated by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1980 and has been cited in
virtually every public nuisance case considered in the State since
then. 35 As explained in 2007, by the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island:
33. Gail v. New England Gas Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 314, 323 (D.R.I. 2006).
See also Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53,
59 (R.I. 1980) ("Actionable nuisances fall into two classifications, public and
private. A private nuisance involves an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land. It involves a material interference with the ordinary
physical comfort or the reasonable use of one's property. A public nuisance is
an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public: it is
behavior that unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort
or convenience of the general community.").
34. Rhode Island law recognizes a distinct legal claim for private
nuisance. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that "a cause of action
for a private nuisance 'arises from the unreasonable use of one's property
that materially interferes with a neighbor's physical comfort or the neighbor's
use of his real estate."' Hydro-Manufacturing Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640
A.2d 950, 959 (R.I. 1994). Furthermore, the Court stressed the distinction
between private nuisance and public nuisance, stating that "[u]nlike a
private nuisance where there is an invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, a public nuisance is an 'unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public."' Id. Such distinction
is consistent with the long recognized legal tenet that "public and private
nuisance 'have almost nothing in common, except that each causes
inconvenience to someone."' Lewis v. Gen. Elec. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60 (D.
Mass. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
35. Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59
(R.I. 1980).
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The requirement of interference with a right "common to
the general public" provides a basis for distinguishing the
almost absolute liability imposed by the doctrine of public
nuisance from the fault based liability imposed by
traditional tort law principles or even from the strict
liability imposed for engaging in unreasonably dangerous
activities. A right "common to the general public" has
been described as a collective right that is shared by
everyone in the community as opposed to a right that is
possessed only by certain members of the public. In
general, it refers to the interference with "the health,
safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the general
community."36
Much legal discourse has been devoted to the application of
this seemingly simple definition to the realities of a complex
world. 37 There are certain categories of "public" rights that are so
well recognized that they necessarily give rise to public nuisance
claims. For example, it has long been recognized that the three
categories identified by the Rhode Island Supreme Court - air,
water, and public rights of way - are indeed public rights, and an
interference therewith can establish liability under the law of
public nuisance. 38 Such widespread acceptance of these
36. Arriaga v. New England Gas Co., 483 F. Supp. 2d 177, 186 (D.R.I.
2007) (quoting Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59
(R.I. 1980)).
37. Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C-3664, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3598,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1998) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984): "To be considered public, the nuisance
must affect an interest common to the general public, rather than peculiar to
one individual or several."); City of Virginia Beach v. Murphy, 389 S.E. 2d
462, 463 (Va. 1990) ("Public also is the nuisance committed 'in such place and
in such manner that the aggregation of private injuries becomes so great and
extensive as to constitute a public annoyance and inconvenience."'); Attorney
General v. Chicago and NW Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 533-34 (Wis. 1874)
("[P]ublic wrong may be considered only as an aggregation of private
wrongs."); WOOD ON NUISANCES, § 17, at 38 n.1 (3d ed. 1893) ("Whatever is
injurious to a large class of the community, or annoys that portion of the
public that necessarily comes in contact with it, is a public nuisance at
common law.").
38. See Steere v. Tucker, 39 R.I. 531 (R.I. 1916); Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I.
210, 1875 WL 4157, at *7 (R.I. 1875). See also Randall S. Abate, Automobile
Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine
as Part of a "Global Warming Solution" in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591,
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
principles, which are grounded in the physical location of the
nuisance, is in accord with the Restatement's definition.39
However, courts have also long recognized that there are
numerous other types of public rights that sustain an appropriate
public nuisance claim. As explained by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, "a public nuisance is a condition or activity which
substantially or unduly interferes with the use of a public place or
with the activities of an entire community."40 This later category
of public right focuses not on the physical location of the nuisance,
as the Rhode Island court did, but instead on the effect the
condition has on the public at large. As the Restatement
recognizes, conditions that affect community wide interests, and
particularly those that impact the health, safety and morals of the
community at large, may fall under the reach of the public
nuisance doctrine despite the fact that they emanate from or are
located on private property. As explained in more detail in
comment g to section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
It is not, however, necessary that the entire community
be affected by a public nuisance, so long as the nuisance
will interfere with those who come in contact with it in
the exercise of a public right or it otherwise affects the
interests of the community at large . . . [T~he spread of
smoke, dust or fumes over a considerable area filled with
private residences may interfere also with the use of the
public streets or affect the health of so many persons as to
involve the interests of the public at large.41
Courts interpreting this provision have recognized that a public
nuisance action can be maintained when conduct affects a
significant number of people:
Public also is the nuisance committed 'in such place and
in such manner that the aggregation of private injuries
600 (Feb 2008) ("Public nuisance must affect the public's common rights, as
opposed to merely inflicting an injury to a large number of people's private
rights. One such common right is the enjoyment of the environment. In the
environmental context, public nuisance claims have been used to abate air
pollution, water pollution, hazardous waste disposal, and excessive noise.").
39. See note 41, infra, and accompanying text.
40. Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 777,
788 (2002).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (1979).
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become so great and extensive as to constitute a public
annoyance and inconvenience, and a wrong against the
community, which may properly be the subject of a public
prosecution. 42
B. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's Lead Pigment Decision
Has Re-Written Centuries of Public Nuisance Precedent
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision stands in stark
contrast to this precedent. Instead of recognizing the critical
distinctions between private nuisance and public nuisance law,
the Court imposed a blanket requirement that public nuisances
must exist in public locations, irrespective of the public nature of
the harm caused. Relying on Professor Donald Gifford, the Court
instead concluded that:
The right of an individual child not to be poisoned by lead
paint is strikingly similar to other examples of nonpublic
rights cited by courts, the Restatement (Second), and
several leading commentators . . . In the words of one
commentator:
Despite the tragic nature of the child's illness, the
exposure to lead-based paint usually occurs within
the most private and intimate of surroundings, his or
her own home. Injuries occurring in this context do
not resemble the rights traditionally understood as
public rights for public nuisance purposes-
obstruction of highways and waterways, or pollution
of air or navigable streams.
The enormous leap that the state urges us to take is
wholly inconsistent with the widely recognized principle
that the evolution of the common law should occur
gradually, predictably, and incrementally. Were we to
42. See New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40,
43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). See also Cline v. Franklin Pork, Inc., 361 N.W.2d
566 (Neb. 1985); City of Virginia Beach v. Murphy, 389 S.E.2d 462, 463 (Va.
1990); Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs., 712 P.2d
914, 917 (Ariz. 1985) ("[A] nuisance may be simultaneously public and
private when a considerable number of people suffer an interference with
their use and enjoyment of land. . .. The torts are not mutually exclusive.").
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hold otherwise, we would change the meaning of public
right to encompass all behavior that causes a widespread
interference with the private rights of numerous
individuals. 43
The Supreme Court's alarmist conclusions should be
disregarded. The reality is that centuries of public nuisance
precedent recognize that dangerous conditions in private locations
constitute a public nuisance when they pose an unreasonable
threat to members of the public. When examining the Rhode
Island Supreme Court decision in context of established public
nuisance law, its limitations, and therefore deficiencies, become
obvious. For example, the following categories of conduct have
long been considered public nuisances because of their widespread
effect on the public health welfare and safety, irrespective of the
physical location of the nuisance itself: "keeping diseased animals"
on private property; interfering with public safety by "stor[ing]
explosives in the midst of a city;" or interfering with the public
morals by operating "houses of prostitution."44 It does not require
any great analysis or thought to see why each of these conditions
is a public nuisance despite the fact that it does not affect the
public air, water or rights of way. However, under this new
precedent from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, defendants in
each of these types could credibly argue that they are immunized
from liability despite the wealth of historical precedent suggesting
otherwise.
The reality is that the Rhode Island Supreme Court failed to
consider or acknowledge the public harm standard when it
overturned the prior legal rulings and jury verdict in State of
Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n. The Court fundamentally
misconstrued the law of nuisance, which concerns itself with
interference with public rights. It is the nature of the right at
issue that determines whether a particular nuisance is public or
not, not the location of the condition. The radical nature of this
departure from prior public nuisance precedent is made manifest
when the 2008 decision is contrasted with the Court's 1998
43. State of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 921 A.2d 428, 454 (R.I.
2008).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, cmt b (1979).
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decision in Pine v. Kalian.45
In Pine v. Kalian, the Rhode Island Attorney General filed a
complaint sounding in public nuisance against a landlord seeking
the abatement of lead-based paint from his rental property.4 6 The
trial court in that case found that "serious health risks to young
children from exposure to lead have been clearly established by
the record in [that] case" and that the home in question "contain[s]
enough lead so as to constitute a continuing, persistent hazard of
lead poisoning to members of the public who occupy such
premises, especially to children of tender years."4 7 Accordingly,
the court concluded:
The premises are a public nuisance. This Court has
general equitable power, as well as statutory jurisdiction
pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1997) § 10-1-1 et seq., to abate a
public nuisance upon the application of the Attorney
General. 48
In affirming the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that "the persistence
of the continuing hazard of lead paint presents immediate and
irreparable harm to the public so long as that hazard remains
unabated."49 Clearly, the presence of lead paint in a single
private dwelling in the State did not interfere with a public right
to water, air or public rights of way, as the Supreme Court in Lead
Indus. Ass'n required.50 Despite this, the Rhode Island Supreme
45. Compare Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008) with Pine v.
Kalian, No. PC 96-2673, 1998 WL 34090599 (R.I. Super. Feb. 2, 1998), affd,
Pine v. Kalian, 723 A.2d 804 (R.I. 1998).
46. Pine, 1998 WL 34090599.
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
49. Pine, 723 A.2d at 805 (R.I. Supreme Court opinion).
50. Indeed, the trial court in Lead Indus. Ass'n relied in part on the
Supreme Court's decision in Kalian when deciding the initial motion to
dismiss in 2001. In the words of the court:
Our Supreme Court has recognized the Attorney General's
prosecution of a public nuisance action seeking abatement of lead
paint from a premises where 'significant amounts of lead had been
found to constitute a hazard to the public and to children, in
particular.' The matter involved an application for a preliminary
injunction by the Attorney General and the Director of the
Department of Health who asserted 'an overriding public interest in
the protection of public health.' The trial justice, having found
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Court understood in 2000 that lead paint could, and indeed did,
constitute a public nuisance. The Pine decision - like the trial
court's decision in the lead case - reflects the long standing
tradition of our courts to utilize the law of public nuisance to
rectify those conditions that cause injury to the public health,
safety and welfare, regardless of whether the condition is located
in a shared public space. 51
The failure of the Rhode Island Supreme Court to
acknowledge or consider the widespread public harm standard
when deciding the State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n case is deeply
troubling both in the context of that case, as well as future public
nuisance cases in Rhode Island. For the lead paint case, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court crafted a definition of public harm
that necessarily excludes lead paint from the protective cloak of a
certain facts based on the evidence before him, had stated his belief
that at a hearing on the merits, the Court 'would rule as a matter of
law based on the evidence ... [that] the premises are a public
nuisance.' Accordingly, the trial court, after including a reference to
its general equitable power as well as jurisdiction pursuant to G.L.
1956 § 10-1-1 et seq. to abate a public nuisance upon application of
the Attorney General, granted the application for a preliminary
injunction and ordered, in part, that the defendants abate all lead
hazards from the premises. In its affirmance order, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the trial justice's finding that the 'persistence of
the continuing hazard of lead paint presents immediate and
irreparable harm to the public so long as that hazard remains
unabated.'
State of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 37, at *23-24 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
51. Ironically, this Court attempted to offer comfort to the thousands of
homeowners and lead poisoned children who were directly and adversely
affected by this decision by suggesting that "an injunction requiring
abatement may be sought against landlords who allow lead paint on their
property to decay." State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 456 (R.I.
2008) (citing Pine v. Kalian, 723 A.2d 804, 804-05 (R.I. 1998)). The reality is,
however, that the Court's rulings in this case affirmatively prohibit the
Attorney General from seeking such an injunction. Specifically, a Kalian-like
injunction action requires that a court first find that the presence of lead
paint in a private home can interfere with a right common to the general
public. However, under the Lead Indus. Assn decision, that public right is
necessarily limited to interference with air, water and public rights of way.
The presence of lead paint cannot, under the explicit holding of Lead Indus.
Ass'n, interfere with an "indivisible resource shared by the public." Lead
Indus. Assn, 723 A.2d at 448. Thus, the "comfort" offered the public is
illusory - no injunction could issue because no public nuisance case could be
maintained.
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public nuisance claim. This definition not only ignored significant
legal precedent concerning public rights but also disregarded
compelling evidence concerning the widespread public health
hazard caused by lead based paint. Indeed, the Rhode Island
legislature all but concluded that lead paint was a public nuisance
when it passed the Rhode Island Lead Poisoning Prevention Act,
which reads in pertinent part: "[T]ens of thousands of Rhode
Island's children are poisoned by lead at levels believed to be
harmful, with most of these poisoned children going undiagnosed
and untreated .. . Childhood lead poisoning is dangerous to the
public health, safety, and general welfare of the people."52 This
widespread harm to the health safety and general welfare of
Rhode Islanders was then documented exhaustively through
weeks of testimony and evidence before the jury. After hearing
this evidence, the jury concluded that the presence of lead paint in
Rhode Island's homes and buildings interfered with the public
health, safety and welfare. 53 However, the Supreme Court did not
52. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-24.6-3(4) and (5) (emphasis added).
53. A center piece of the lead paint Defendants' arguments to the jury in
this case was that the public nuisance pled by the State was not a cause of
any harm to the public. For example, in opening arguments, the Defendants
said:
The State says there are almost 250,000 properties, and that's
homes and churches and schools and hospitals, that have some lead
paint. That's what the state says. But the evidence shows that the
vast majority have never harmed a child. But the state says there's
a massive public nuisance. What does this mean? It means that the
vast majority of homes and properties aren't the problem. What else
will we learn? You'll learn that childhood lead poisoning has become
a concern, not of all old homes with lead paint, not all properties
with lead paint, but of a very small percentage of old homes with
lead paint that's not properly maintained. One half of one percent of
all homes last year. That's not a massive public nuisance. That's a
focused, targeted problem. It's not a problem everywhere in the
state where there is a - any lead paint. It's not lead wherever it is
found. It's confined to certain areas and specific rental units. And as
I said, there's a Web site that shows where the problem lies.
Opening Statement of Defendants, November 1, 2005, (64/136) Tr. at 113,
App. 7291 (on file with author). Similarly, the Defendants also claimed that:
That's evidence you're going hear and that evidence is not going to
be seriously disputed, I suggest to you. And that evidence paints a
picture of isolated, small, targeted issues that have to be dealt with
and can be dealt with. That evidence you will see does not support
the conclusion that there should be a declaration of a statewide
public nuisance.
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consider or even mention the mountain of evidence concerning
lead paint's effects on the public health, safety and welfare,
choosing instead to focus itself on its restrictive interpretation of a
legal standard. Such a limitation has obvious implications for
Rhode Island's homeowners, who must now bear the entire burden
of lead paint themselves, and for Rhode Island's children, who
continue to face the permanent effects of crumbling lead paint in
their homes. But the limitation has more subtle implications for
future generations as they attempt to redress harms caused by
environmental toxins and obtain abatement of those toxins.
Opening Statement of Defendants, November 2, 2005, (65/136) Tr. at 254,
App. 7295 (on file with author). Then, after a full opportunity to present
evidence to the jury to support their position that the presence of lead in
Rhode Island does not constitute a public nuisance, the Defendants argued
strenuously to the jury that it should reject the State's definition of the public
nuisance. In closing arguments, Defendants argued that:
As you have heard already, there are specific known addresses in
Rhode Island where there are children with elevated blood lead
levels. But you aren't being asked to decide whether those houses,
those individual properties or some subset of properties, is a public
nuisance. You aren't being asked to decide that. You are being
asked to decide that the cumulative presence of all pigment on an
estimated 246,000 properties throughout the state, whether that's
the single public nuisance. And the answer to that should be no, a
resounding no. A no answer from you on that first question on the
verdict form will end this case.
Closing Statement of Defendant, February 9, 2006, (118/136) Tr. at 7704-
7705, App. 8263-8264 (on file with author). See also Closing Statement of
Millennium Holdings LLC, February 8, 2006, (117/136) Tr. at 7677, App.
8233 (on file with author) ("Of approximately the 250,000 dwellings in Rhode
Island that are believed to contain lead paint, there were 172 children who
potentially were in those dwellings and had a lead level of such that it was
potentially related to lead paint. This is clearly a problem. Every one of
those 172 kids are a problem. But that statistic, in that content, does not
create a statewide public nuisance.").
The jury flatly rejected the Defendants' factual proposition. Despite
the cross-examination, despite the arguments presented by Defendants, the
jury simply did not believe that the problems associated with lead pigments
in Rhode Island are limited to a few homes or properties. Instead, they
concluded that it was the presence of lead pigments throughout the state -
the condition alleged by the State - that was the public nuisance in Rhode
Island. The jury made that decision based on the mountains of evidence they
had been presented during this lengthy trial. Appellate procedure simply
should not have permitted the Defendants to utilize an appellate court to
undo a jury verdict based on competent evidence.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR A
PUBLIC NUISANCE FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERS THE LAW OF PUBLIC
NUISANCE IN RHODE ISLAND
In addition to restricting the definition of public right, thereby
effectively abolishing the well-recognized ability of public nuisance
law to redress widespread harms to the public, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court also radically redefined and limited the law
concerning liability for a public nuisance. Specifically, the Court
incorporated two new requirements of "control" into Rhode
Island's public nuisance law: "a defendant must have control over
the instrumentality causing the alleged nuisance at the time the
damage occurs."54
While seemingly simple on its face, this ruling effectively re-
wrote the law on liability for public nuisance in Rhode Island and
abrogated the ability of public nuisance to shield citizens from the
threat of future harm. The cumulative result of these changes is
to effectively neuter the law of public nuisance in Rhode Island so
that it can no longer protect the public from harms, even those
that can meet the narrow definition of public right invented by the
court.
A. Legal Precedent for Imposing Liability for a Public Nuisance
To understand fully the conundrum caused by the Supreme
Court's decision, it is first necessary to understand the basic law
of liability for a public nuisance. It is well established that
liability for public nuisance can arise in two distinct
circumstances: (1) those who create a public nuisance; and (2)
those who maintain a public nuisance.
The State of Rhode Island alleged in its lawsuit that the lead
pigment manufacturers were liable for creating a public nuisance.
As the trial court summarized, the State alleged that:
[T]he defendants are responsible for the presence of lead,
54. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d 428, 449 (R.I. 2008). In support
of that proposition, the Court relied primarily on three decisions from the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island: Friends of the
Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990) ("Dutra 1"); Friends of the
Sakonnet v. Dutra, 749 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1990) ("Dutra Il") and City of
Manchester v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.R.I. 1986). See
discussion, infra, at III.B.1.
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a product recognized by our courts and the Legislature as
constituting a potentially severehealth hazard to
members of the public, in public and private properties
throughout the State .. . [T]he defendants' misconduct,
including a conspiracy calculated to mislead the public
and the government regarding the danger to the public
resulting from exposure to lead, has unreasonably
interfered with the public health, including the public's
right to be free from the hazards of unabated lead. 55
Liability for creating, or contributing to the creation of a public
nuisance, has long been recognized under public nuisance law. As
the trial court concluded:
'[O]ne is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an
activity, not only when he carries on the activity but also
when he participates to a substantial extent in carrying it
on.'56
This is consistent with a wealth of precedent from around the
country that holds that a defendant is liable for a nuisance if it
sets in motion the chain of events that ultimately creates or
contributes to the creation of the nuisance. 57 As summarized by
American Jurisprudence:
55. State of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 37, at *26-7 (R.I. Super. Apr. 2, 2001).
56. Id. at *26 (citing 4 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) TORTS § 834 at 149
(1979)).
57. See, e.g., City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., No. 06-CV-
2233, 2007 WL 4462448, at *50 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007) ("Satisfaction of the
causation requirement for liability in public nuisance actions requires proof
that a defendant, alone or with others, created, contributed to, or maintained
the alleged interference with the public right."); City of Milwaukee v. NL
Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Wis. 2004) (finding in a public nuisance
case against a lead pigment manufacturer that the appropriate factual
inquiry was whether "the defendant's conduct was a substantial cause of the
existence of a public nuisance and that the nuisance was a substantial factor
in causing injury to the public, which injury is the subject of the action.");
City of New York v. Beretta Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(in suit against gun industry for creating a public nuisance, court found that
"[s]atisfaction of the causation requirement for liability in public nuisance
actions requires proof that a defendant, alone or with others, created,
contributed to, or maintained the alleged interference with the public right.
Whether specific acts or omissions meet this standard involves a fact-
intensive inquiry . . .") (internal citations omitted).
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Generally, one who creates a nuisance is liable for the
resulting damages, and ordinarily such person's liability
continues as long as the nuisance continues. Liability for
nuisance may be imposed upon one who sets in motion the
forces which eventually cause the tortious act, and all who
participate in the creation or maintenance of a nuisance
are liable for injuries suffered by others as a result of
such nuisance. 58
In addition to liability for creating a public nuisance, a
separate category of liability exists for those who maintain a
public nuisance. This category generally contemplates liability for
those who did not create the nuisance originally, but instead
continued to maintain the nuisance in such a manner in which
harm is probable. 59 While there is little Rhode Island precedent
discussing the distinction between liability for creating a public
nuisance and liability for maintaining a public nuisance, other
courts across the country have provided insights. For example, in
Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., the Wisconsin
Supreme Court considered a public nuisance case concerning tree
branches that blocked a stop sign.6 0 In resolving the issue, the
58. See Anne E. Melley, Nuisances, 58 AM. JUR. 2D NUISANCES § 112
(2010) (emphasis added). See also City of New York v. Beretta Corp., 315 F.
Supp. 2d 256, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Persons who join or participate in the
creation or maintenance of a public nuisance are liable jointly and severally
for the wrong and resulting injury."); New York v. Fermenta ACS Corp., 608
N.Y.S.2d 980, 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) ("While generally nuisance actions are
brought against landowners . . . 'everyone who creates a nuisance or
participates in the creation or maintenance . . . of a nuisance are liable . . . for
the wrong and injury done thereby."') (internal citations omitted); New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection & Energy v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 821 F.
Supp. 999, 1012-13 (D.N.J. 1993) ("It is enough for a nuisance claim to stand
that the [defendants] . . . allegedly contributed to the creation of a situation
which, it is alleged, unreasonably interfered with a right common to the
general public."); Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving,
Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1619-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("[A]ny person
creating or assisting to create and maintain the nuisance was liable to be
sued for its abatement and for damages") (internal citations omitted); Duncan
v. Flagler, 132 P.2d 939, 940 (Okla. 1942) ("[T]he general rule is stated that
all those who participate in the creation . . . of a nuisance are liable to third
persons for injuries suffered therefrom"); Shurpin v. Elmhurst, 148 Cal. App.
3d 94, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) .
59. See, e.g., Maio v. Ilg, 199 A.2d 727 (R.I. 1964) (recognizing liability in
Rhode Island for maintaining a public nuisance).
60. 646 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Wis. 2002).
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Court relied heavily on the case of Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal
Railway Co.61 The Physicians Plus court noted that the Brown
court:
[D]istinguishes liability for maintaining a public nuisance
from liability for creating a public nuisance, by requiring
actual or constructive notice in maintenance of public
nuisance cases. Based on this distinction, we interpret
Brown as essentially dividing public nuisance cases into
two classes. The first class, maintenance of a public
nuisance, bases liability on the defendant's failure to
abate a public nuisance of which the defendant had
actual or constructive notice. The defendant did not
affirmatively create the nuisance, so liability is
necessarily predicated on the defendant's notice of the
hazardous condition . . . In contrast, the second class of
cases focuses on the defendant's creation of the public
nuisance and likewise -does not require proof that the
defendant had actual or constructive notice of the
hazardous condition.62
The liability of a property owner for maintaining a public nuisance
was also addressed by the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York in New York v. Solvent Chem. Co.:
[A] landowner is subject to liability for maintaining a
public nuisance on his property 'irrespective of negligence
or fault.' 'Liability [of a possessor of land] is not based
upon responsibility for the creation of the harmful
condition, but upon the fact that he has exclusive control
over the land and the things done upon it and should
have the responsibility of taking reasonable measures to
remedy conditions on it that are a source of harm to
others. Thus a vendee ... of land upon which a harmful
physical condition exists may be liable under the rule
here stated for failing to abate it after he takes
possession, even though it was created by his vendor,
lessor or other person and even though he had no part in
61. See 224 N.W. 748 (Wis. 1929), on reargument, 227 N.W. 385 (Wis.
1929).
62. Physicians Plus Ins. Corp., 646 N.W.2d. at 791 n.19.
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its creation.' However, an owner 'who passively continues
a public nuisance created by a previous owner cannot be
held absolutely liable for injuries sustained as a result of
that nuisance unless it is established that he had actual
or constructive notice of the existence of the nuisance.'63
Importantly for this discussion, creation and maintenance of a
nuisance are not mutually exclusive liability concepts. In the
same case, liability may be established against some defendants
for originally creating the nuisance, and separately against other
defendants for maintaining the nuisance.
Long standing public nuisance law recognizes liability for
creating a public nuisance after immediate control over the
nuisance ceases. As explained in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
Activities that create a physical condition differ from
other activities in that they may cause an invasion of
another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land after
the activity itself ceases... if the activity has resulted in
the creation of a physical condition that is of itself
harmful after the activity that created it has ceased, a
person who carried on the activity that created the
condition or who participated to a substantial extent in
the activity is subject to the liability for a nuisance, for
the continuing harm. His active conduct has been a
substantial factor in creating the harmful condition and
so long as his condition continues the harm is traceable to
him. This is true even though he is no longer in a position
to abate the condition and to stop the harm. 64
Furthermore, other courts considering this very same argument in
63. 880 F. Supp. 139, 144 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 834, cmt. (e). See also New York
v. Solvent Chem. Co., 880 F. Supp. 139 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[O]ne who creates a
public nuisance cannot avoid liability by selling the property on which the
nuisance was created."); United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics
Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 968-70 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); Adams v. NVR Homes,
Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 251 (D. Md. 2000) ("Where the work or finished product
of a third party is inherently dangerous and constitutes a public nuisance,
such third party may be held liable for the creation of the public nuisance
even though the third party no longer has control of the work or product
creating the public nuisance.").
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the context of public nuisance cases against lead pigment
manufacturers have rejected such a holding. For example, in
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the California
appellate court expressly rejected the notion of control adopted by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court: 'liability for nuisance does not
hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the
property, nor on whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance;
the critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted
in the creation of the nuisance."'65 Similarly, the Wisconsin
Appellate Court permitted a lead paint public nuisance case to
proceed against a former manufacturer of lead pigment despite
the fact that that defendant did not own the properties in which
the lead paint was located.66
B. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Decision
Without any regard or acknowledgement of these distinctions
in public nuisance liability, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
decision imposed a blanket requirement of control. Under its
newly articulated theory, a defendant can only be liable for a
public nuisance if it is in current control of the nuisance at the
time that actual physical injury is sustained to the public interest
or right. This conclusion, however, is at odds with the
Restatement and long standing precedent cited above in two
respects: (1) it fails to distinguish between liability for creating a
nuisance, as opposed to liability for maintaining a nuisance; and
(2) the temporal requirement eviscerates long standing precedent
that recognizes public nuisance's unique ability to remedy the
threat of future harm.
1. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's Decision Improperly Blurs
the Distinction Between Liability for Creating a Nuisance and
Liability for Maintaining a Nuisance
The Rhode Island Supreme Court blurred the clear distinction
between creating a nuisance and maintaining a nuisance when it
imposed strict control requirements on the creators of public
nuisance. What is most puzzling, perhaps, about the Rhode
65. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
66. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus, 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. 2004).
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Island Supreme Court's conclusions regarding control is that it
attempted to justify such conclusions by relying primarily on two
cases from the District Court for the District of Rhode Island -
Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra,6 7 (Dutra 1) and a later opinion in
the same case, also captioned Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra,68
(Dutra II). The Court explicitly relies on both the Dutra I and
Dutra II decisions, but a reading of both cases indicates that the
Supreme Court decision is in direct conflict with the conclusions of
both Dutra opinions.
The Dutra cases were brought by the State of Rhode Island
and others in an effort to remediate a public nuisance caused by a
defective septic system. The defects in the system were causing
raw sewage to run "directly from the leaching field, on the surface
of the ground for approximately 250 feet, into the Sakonnet River
and into the basement of a home located between the septic
system and the River."69 Suit was filed against the prior owners
of the septic system, as well as the current homeowners.
In Dutra I, the court considered a motion to dismiss the public
nuisance claim brought by the former owners of the septic system.
In that decision, the Rhode Island federal court considered the
liability of those who create a nuisance, as opposed to those who
maintain a nuisance. In considering liability for the creation of a
nuisance, the district court was unambiguous and unequivocal in
its conclusion that:
This Court has discovered no Rhode Island (or other)
precedent that bars recovery of nuisance damages simply
because the defendants no longer control the
instrumentality alleged to have caused the nuisance. If
Rhode Island courts allow suits for nuisance damages to
go forward although the nuisance itself has already been
abated, it follows that suits should be allowed, if within
the statute of limitations, against one who is alleged to
have caused damages by a nuisance even if that person
no longer controls the alleged nuisance. 70
67. 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990).
68. 749 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1990).
69. Dutra I, 738 F. Supp at 628.
70. Id. at 633 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In so
concluding, the Dutra I court did not rely on or endorse the opinion in Nat'1
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Accordingly, the court denied the motion for summary judgment
and allowed the claim to proceed.
In Dutra II, the same court considered a motion for a
preliminary injunction based on the same set of facts by
Q.L.C.R.I., the owner of the property upon which the faulty septic
system was located. The court made explicit that Q.L.C.R.I.'s
potential public nuisance liability was limited to maintenance of a
public nuisance created by another. 71 The court then concluded
that because Q.L.C.R.I. had direct control over the septic system,
it too was liable for the public nuisance: "Q.L.C.R.I. and its
predecessors-in-interest retained control of the failed sewerage
system and had the correlative duty to maintain the system. Any
nuisance that the failed system has created is the responsibility of
Q.L.C.R.I. and its predecessors-in-interest." 72 Importantly, the
Dutra II court was explicit that immediate control was not a
requirement for all public nuisance liability. Specifically, after
discussing the requirement on immediate control for one who
maintains a nuisance, the Court was quick to point out that
"'while at common law it is the general rule that the owner of land
ceases to be liable in negligence for its condition when the
premises pass out of his control before the injuries result, this is
not the general rule in the case of nuisance."'73 Thus, both Dutra
decisions are explicit in their conclusion that a party who creates a
public nuisance is liable for that nuisance even though the party
no longer controls the instrumentality creating the nuisance or
the physical location where the nuisance is created.
In light of these findings, it is difficult to understand the
Gypsum Co. (637 F. Supp. at 656) as Supreme Court stated; instead, the
Dutra I court explicitly rejected Nat'l Gypsum as controlling precedent in
Rhode Island: "[T]he decision in National Gypsum, although decided by this
Court, was based on New Hampshire law and thus is not binding precedent
for this case." Dutra I, 738 F. Supp. at 633 n.25.
71. Dutra II, 749 F. Supp. at 394 ("The liability of Q.L.C.R.I. under the
law of nuisance depends primarily on the question of control and duty to
maintain discussed above. One who controls a nuisance is liable for damages
caused by that nuisance. It does not matter that the one in control did not
create the nuisance, as a successor-in-interest who maintains a nuisance,
that person is liable for damages caused by the nuisance. Successors-in-
interest can be held responsible for abating the nuisance created by their
predecessors.").
72. Id. at 395.
73. Id. at 395 n.21 (emphasis added).
2010] 465
466 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:437
Rhode Island Supreme Court's eagerness to incorporate the
control element into the lead paint cases. As the District Court for
the District of Rhode Island properly observed, there is simply no
precedent in Rhode Island for barring a public nuisance claim
because "the defendants no longer control the instrumentality
alleged to have caused the nuisance."74 Indeed, the reasons for
this are only logical. Under current Rhode Island precedent,
polluters are offered the option of dumping and running without
fear of the consequences. Companies can bury toxic waste on
private property and walk away, knowing that they cannot be held
liable for creating a public nuisance, nor required to abate the
public health catastrophe that they created. Infamous
environmental situations, like the Love Canal cases from the mid-
1970s, cannot be remedied in Rhode Island because the polluters
have been granted immunity as they do not "control" the
properties upon which the nuisance is located. In short, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court created an incentive to do what the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court warned against decades ago: "[tjo
permit [a defendant] to avert responsibility for abating a nuisance
which it created under the proposition that it may abandon its
enterprise . . . ."75
2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Decision Prevents Public
Nuisance Claims from Preventing Future Harm to the Public
A more subtle, but no less troubling, aspect of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court decision is the intrinsic assumption therein
that public nuisance cases cannot, and do not, arise until after
harm to the public has occurred. Specifically, in adopting the
newly articulated "control" standard, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court also imposed a temporal requirement: the control had to
exist at the time the injury occurred. By stringently requiring
control at the time that children are actually poisoned by lead
pigment, the Supreme Court effectively eviscerated one of the
most bedrock principles of common law public nuisance in Rhode
Island - prevention of future harm to the public.
Prior to the 2008 decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
74. Dutra I, 738 F. Supp. at 633.
75. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 353 A.2d 471, 479 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 371 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1977).
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on repeated occasions recognized "[t]he essential element of an
actionable nuisance is that persons have suffered harm or are
threatened with injuries that they ought not have to bear."7 6 This
conclusion is consistent with over a century of recognition that
public nuisance is unique in its ability to remedy a condition
before additional harms occur:
The ground of this jurisdiction in cases of . . . public
nuisances, is the ability of courts of equity to give a more
speedy, effectual, and permanent remedy, than can be
had at law. They can not only prevent nuisances that are
threatened, and before irreparable mischief ensues, but
arrest or abate those in progress, and, by perpetual
injunction, protect the public against them in the future;
whereas courts of law can only reach existing nuisances,
leaving future acts to be the subject of new prosecutions
or proceedings. This is a salutary jurisdiction, especially
where a nuisance affects the health, morals, or safety of
the community.77
This important element of nuisance was recognized recently
by the Second Circuit, when it observed:
Nor does public nuisance theory require that the harm
caused must be immediate, as even threatened harm is
actionable under the federal common law of nuisance ....
Judge Oakes . . . recognized this attribute of nuisance
law [in a prior case], writing that '[o]ne distinguishing
feature of equitable relief is that it may be granted upon
the threat of harm which has not yet occurred."' 78
In finding that nuisance liability for lead poisoning cannot be
established until children are actually poisoned, as opposed to
when the community wide threat of harm was created, 79 the Court
76. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982) (emphasis added).
77. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 (1887). See also New Mexico v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1257 (D.N.M. 2004) ("Abatement of a
public nuisance involving risks of public exposure to hazardous waste brings
an end to the nuisance and to the risks, thus minimizing the externalized
costs of the nuisance before many of those costs have been incurred.").
78. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 357 (2d Cir. 2009).
79. State of Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 449 (R.I.
2008).
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has abandoned its long and rich tradition of utilizing public
nuisance law to shield its citizens from the certain harms that will
result from environmental contaminants. Such a monumental
shift neuters the ability of the State and the Attorney General to
remedy harms and correct hazardous conditions prior to the
actual injury to Rhode Islanders.
Instead, embracing the clear standard used by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in Wood v. Picillo compels a very different
result.80 Under the Wood mandate that liability arises when an
actor creates a threat of future harm to the public health and
welfare, the appropriate inquiry becomes when the threat of harm
created, rather then when actual physical injury occurred. In the
lead poisoning situation, the threat of harm arose when lead
pigment was used in residential buildings in Rhode Island. As the
evidence in this case showed, from that moment in time the
poisonous paint was either an immediate harm because it was
deteriorated and accessible to children or it was a threatened
harm, because it could (and inevitably would) deteriorate and thus
contaminate children's environments. Clearly, under the Wood
analysis, there are major factual and legal flaws in assigning sole
responsibility for the lead poisoning crisis to homeowners within
the State. Homeowners were not in control of the public nuisance
at the time the threat of harm to Rhode Islanders arose because
lead paint was banned more than a quarter century ago. Current
Rhode Island homeowners cannot be responsible for putting lead
pigmented paint on the walls of their property and, accordingly,
they cannot be responsible for the presence of lead pigment in the
State of Rhode Island.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE LIABILITY
FOLLOWING STATE V. LEAD INDUS. ASS'N
At this juncture, it is difficult to predict whether State v. Lead
Indus. Ass'n will fundamentally alter the landscape of public
nuisance liability or will become narrowly construed and relegated
to deny the application of public nuisance in lead poisoning cases
in Rhode Island. Current trends seem to suggest that this case
will become a footnote in the decades long struggle against lead
poisoning.
80. Wood, 443 A.2d at 1244.
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Specifically, in the eighteen months since the decision was
handed down, the composition of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has changed. Chief Justice Frank Williams, the author of the
opinion, has since resigned his position with the Court. 81 Until
another public nuisance case comes before the court, it is difficult
to predict how expansively the newly configured court will
interpret the lead decision. However, the decision has created
significant loopholes and immunity for corporate wrong doers and
polluters, and there is no doubt that a future decision on public
nuisance would require a detailed discussion of the lead decision.
Significantly, however, no court in Rhode Island or around the
country has cited the lead paint decision as precedent in any
public nuisance case. While the decision has received some
attention in scholarly articles, it has not been adopted by any
other court considering difficult public nuisance issues.
Significantly, courts around the country have continued to issue
more moderate public nuisance decisions, signaling that the new
narrow interpretation in Rhode Island will not necessarily impact
other public nuisance suits. 82 Of particular significance is a
recent decision issued by the Second Circuit, Conn. v. Am. Elec.
Power Co.83 In that case, the court considered claims brought by
"two groups of Plaintiffs, one consisting of eight States and New
York City, and the other consisting of three land trusts . . ."84 The
court explained the crux of the plaintiffs' complaint:
[The Plaintiffs] separately sued the same six electric
power corporations that own and operate fossil-fuel-fired
power plants in twenty states ... seeking abatement of
81. Paul Edward Parker, The Williams Court: Key decisions Included
Lead Paint, Gambling, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 15, 2008, at Al5.
82. Of particular interest is a recent editorial published in the National
Journal and co-authored by Steven R. Williams, counsel for DuPont in the
Rhode Island litigation. DuPont, which settled with the State prior to trial,
was a former manufacturer of lead pigments used in residential paint. Mr.
Williams analogized the Rhode Island Supreme Court decision to a "legal
equivalent of a shot gun blast to the head," but ultimately concluded that
"public nuisance did not die as a result of the Rhode Island decision." See
Steven R. Williams et al., Public Nuisance: The Tort That Refuses to Die, THE
NAT'L LAw J., April 6, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429614761&hbxlogin=1.
83. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
84. Id. at 314.
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Defendants' ongoing contributions to the public nuisance
of global warming. Plaintiffs claim that global warming,
to which Defendants contribute as the "five largest
emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States and ...
among the largest in the world," by emitting 650 million
tons per year of carbon dioxide, is causing and will
continue to cause serious harms affecting human health
and natural resources.85
In deciding that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for
public nuisance, the Second Circuit articulated several legal
principles that seem to contradict, or at least call into question,
the conclusions of the Rhode Island court. For example, the
Second Circuit concluded that:
Threat of future harm can confer standing to asset a
public nuisance claim: "Nor does public nuisance theory
require that the harm caused must be immediate, as even
threatened harm is actionable under the federal common
law of nuisance."86
Fact that others may contribute to creating or
maintaining the same nuisance does not preclude liability
upon defendants to the suit: "Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that their current and future injuries are 'fairly
traceable' to Defendants' conduct. For purposes of Article
III standing they are not required to pinpoint which
specific harms of the many injuries they assert are caused
by particular Defendants, nor are they required to show
that Defendants' emissions alone cause their injuries. It
is sufficient that they allege that Defendants' emissions
contribute to their injuries."87
Public nuisance are not localized, but are defined by
widespread harm, including harm to public health:
"Defendants' assertion that the federal common law of
nuisance mandates that the harm be localized is similarly
misplaced. The touchstone of a common law public
85. Id.
86. Id. at 357.
87. Id. at 347.
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nuisance action is that the harm is widespread,
unreasonably interfering with a right common to the
general public."88
As those of us interested in the academic debate about public
nuisance watch for guidance from courts on the viability of the
cause of action in the future, we must constantly be mindful of the
profound impact that a court's decision on this legal issue has on
people. The lead paint decision denied justice to children in Rhode
Island and has allowed a legacy of poisoning to continue within
the State. It also signaled a shift towards polluters and
corporations being granted immunity from the consequences of
their actions. Future public nuisance cases will deal with these
realities and time will tell if this ancient doctrine, which has
survived centuries of legal wrangling, will continue to protect the
citizens of this country.
88. Id. at 357. Other relevant public nuisance decisions issued since the
Rhode Island decision include: North Carolina ex. Rel. Cooper v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp 2d 812 (W.D.N.C. 2009); Gates v. Rohm and Haas
Co., No. 06-1743, 2008 WL 2977867 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2008); Birke v.
Oakwood Worldwide, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
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